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•  The Key Players—China, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea—dominate almost all aspects
of the Asia-Pacific oil market.  Clearly, future developments in the oil markets in these countries will
have major strategic and commercial implications.  China and India will play a particularly large role
as their economies continue to develop.
•  Following a period of rapid regional demand growth from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, the past
several years have been characterized by relatively stagnant overall demand.  This stagnation came
at a time when approximately 2.5 mmb/d of CDU capacity came on line, leading to a precipitous
drop in refining margins.
•  Among the policy trends that will drive the oil industry in the Key Players in the future is continued
deregulation and privatization, as well as environmental regulations resulting in ever-tightening
product specifications.
China
•  The petroleum industry is one of the most protected industries in China.  However, this is changing,
especially with China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001.
•  In spite of slow progress in China’s WTO implementation, the government appears to be
determined to comply with the WTO rules as much as possible.  As a result, delay is very likely, but
in the end the state oil companies will eventually subject themselves to more competition in a freer
market under WTO.
•  A 1998 reorganization, restructured CNPC/PetroChina and Sinopec into integrated oil companies,
although CNPC/PetroChina still dominates upstream production and Sinopec controls a larger
portion of the refineries.  Downstream activities are divided along geographical lines, with
CNPC/PetroChina controlling the North and West, and Sinopec dominating the South and East.
•  Since October 2001, petroleum prices have been linked to a basket of Singapore, Rotterdam, and
New York prices.  Changes take place when prices move outside a defined band.
CNPC/PetroChina and Sinopec have some flexibility in setting prices as they can set their ownKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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specific final prices within 16 percent of the baseline retail price (8 percent above and 8 percent
below the baseline price).
•  A combination of rapid growth in petroleum product consumption and slow growth in oil production
will lead to a rapid rise in imports, especially from the Middle East.  Because of this, China is under
pressure to increase its sour-crude processing capacity to deal with increasing Middle East crude
imports and the declining availability of sweet crudes within the Asia-Pacific region.
•  China has pushed hard to promote overseas oil investments by state oil companies.  The leader in
this area is CNPC, but other state oil companies are catching up.  It is part of the Chinese
government’s overall strategy to deal with growing concerns over the country’s energy security.
India
•  Over the past several years, India has initiated a number of oil industry reforms.  In April 2002 the
government dissolved its administered pricing mechanism (APM), which in principle resulted in a
partial decontrol of domestic product prices.  In practice, however, the oil marketing companies still
require the government’s agreement to adjust prices.
•  The process of privatizing state-owned downstream oil companies was also initiated in 2002.  To
begin, IBP Ltd. was sold to Indian Oil Corporation, which is state-owned, so this could hardly be
considered a case of privatization.  Plans to privatize Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL)
and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL) have been a subject of much debate, but they
look to be moving forward. The government has invited bids for the sale of a 35 percent share and
management control of HPCL.  There are also indications that a public offering of BPCL will be
executed through both foreign and domestic channels, but the exact details have not been
formalized.
•  India’s refining capacity doubled between 1995 and 2001, transforming the country from a major
importer of middle distillates to a net exporter.  While demand growth has slowed, Indian refiners
continue to prosper under the umbrellas of tariff protection, which currently amounts to an effective
rate of approximately 7 percent.Key Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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•  Over half of India’s crude is sourced from the Middle East.  Domestic crudes account for about 30
percent of the total crude requirement, and the remainder is imported from the Atlantic Basin and
other Asian countries.  Although the pricing mechanism is still a subject of controversy, with
deregulation, state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) should be able to align
the price of domestic crudes more closely to global prices.
•  Historically India’s overseas investment strategy has been quite limited, but in recent years it has
become much more aggressive.  ONGC is in the midst of a major push abroad, as evidenced by
participation in Sakhalin I, Sudan, and negotiations in a wide array of countries, including Iran.  This
should help offset declines in ONGC’s domestic production, which has dropped from a peak of
630 kb/d in the mid-1990s to approximately 500 kb/d.
Indonesia
•  In October 2001 Indonesia passed the Oil and Gas Law which ended Pertamina’s monopoly over
the nation’s oil market.  The new law ended Pertamina’s control over upstream licensing rights and
production-sharing contracts are now overseen by a government body, BP Migas.  It also sets the
stage for the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
•  Among the challenges the country faces is bringing petroleum prices more in line with the global
market.  Price subsidies are a drain on government revenue and also distort consumption patterns,
making it hard for Indonesia to satisfy a domestic demand slate which is heavily skewed toward
more expensive “spec” products, such as gasoline and middle distillates.  It should be noted that
while there is no tariff on imported crude, the tariff on imported finished products is 5 percent.
•  Because of security problems in some producing areas, and the fact that new finds have not off-set
declines in older producing fields, Indonesia’s crude and condensate production has been in decline
since the mid 1990s.  With mature fields and fewer attractive prospects available, Indonesia will
likely have to offer more attractive production-sharing terms to encourage investment and increase




•  In 2002, Japan posted its third consecutive year of negative growth in petroleum product
consumption.  This is obviously a poor environment for Japan’s refiners, which have slowly adjusted
to the fact that closures are necessary.  Some progress has been made, including a recent deal
between Nippon Oil Corporation (NOC) and Idemitsu that will result in the closure of the Hyogo
refinery, but refiners are hesitant to shut down on their own because others will simply take the
market share.  In the long-run, the move toward stricter specifications could force closures which
could rationalize the industry.
•  While the situation appears to be bleak for Japan’s refiners, it could be worse—there are several
characteristics of the Japanese market that give domestic refiners built-in protection from outside
competition: (1) Like all domestic refiners, the freight differential between crude and product
imports provides some support. (2) The fact that the country has relatively small product receiving
terminals, coupled with hefty storage requirements for product importers, acts as a major brake on
competition. (3) Japanese refiners enjoy favorable tariffs, particularly for fuel oil.  While the market
is nominally deregulated and open, this gauntlet of obstacles makes it difficult for competitors to
penetrate that market.
•  The state-run Japan National Oil Company (JNOC) is scheduled to be dismantled by 2005, but
Japan is continuing its drive to secure more equity oil.  The Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) is playing a key role in recent talks with Russian ministries and oil companies, as
well as in negotiations surrounding access to the Azadegan field in Iran.
•  The details of the JNOC dissolution are still in the works, but it is understood that the assets held by
INPEX, JODECO and SODECO will be merged into an internationally competitive flagship
company.  This company will eventually be privatized, but safeguards will be put in place to ensure
that it is not taken over by an international oil company.  JNOC affiliate JAPEX is to be listed
separately by the end of this year.  Most of JNOC’s other assets would be disposed of over time,
except for some of the more valuable assets which may be taken over by the merged flagship




•  Beginning in 1991 South Korea product prices were adjusted to ensure profitability so that refiners
could invest to become internationally competitive prior to deregulation.  In 1996 formal price
controls were abandoned and replaced with competitive Singapore pricing plus a hefty “Korea
factor.”  On January 1, 1997 prices were fully deregulated, but they did not change, possibly due to
market sharing agreements.  Since 1999 new entry and imports have been allowed and a few
independent retailers are putting some pressure on prices.  Indeed, around 10 percent of the market
is now controlled by independents, as opposed to 1 percent in 1999.
•  Current import tariffs are 5 percent for crude oil and 7 percent for products, which provides a small
level of protection for domestic refiners.  In the face of low profitability, the industry has requested
that the tariff on products be increased to 12 percent.  It remains to be seen whether the new
administration will support this change.
•  Overcapacity is likely to dissuade potential market entrants from building new refineries.  It has also
resulted in Korean refiners flooding the international products market.
•  While the market shares of the major players have remained roughly the same since price
deregulation in 1997, there have been some changes.  For example, Hanwha was acquired by
Hyundai Oil and 50 percent of Hyundai Oil’s equity was purchased by Abu Dhabi’s IPIC
(International Petroleum Investment Company).  Hanwha, now renamed Inchon, is in bankruptcy
and is being offered for sale.  Existing Korean refiners want to buy it so independents and foreign
companies cannot purchase it and use the facilities for storage to satisfy the law requiring 60 days
storage of product imports.
•  The state-owned Korea National Oil Company (KNOC) continues to push forward in pursuing
overseas equity stakes in exploration and production.  The South Korean government has charged
KNOC with the goal of providing 10 percent of South Korea’s oil by 2010.  Currently KNOC is a





China, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea dominate the Asia-Pacific oil market. As illustrated by
Figure 1, this group includes the region’s top five consumers and several of its major producers.
Clearly, future developments in energy and economic policy among these “Key Players” will have major
strategic and commercial implications.  This study evaluates the Key Players’ role in the region, and also
provides special insights into the current and future issues that will affect the oil market in each of these
countries.  It begins with a regional economic and energy outlook, followed by a discussion of the
regional refining picture, crude and product balances, and regional policy trends—all with an emphasis
on the Key Players.  The study then dissects some of the important issues that are driving the oil market
in each of the Key Players.  Overall, this is an exciting and tumultuous time as the Key Players struggle
to adjust to the uncertainty surrounding shifting consumption patterns and moves toward deregulation
and privatization.  Understanding these important changes is critical to policy-makers and commercial
players interested in the Asia-Pacific region.
Figure 1
Total Oil Consumption (kb/d)
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Over the past several decades the Asia-Pacific economies have been among the most dynamic in the
world, and the economies of China, Japan, India, Indonesia and South Korea dominate the region.  For
comparison, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the share of GDP of the Key Players using two common
measures:  (1) GDP in U.S. dollars, which reflects the vagaries of exchange rates and the high cost of
living in Japan, and (2) GDP in terms of Purchasing Power Parity, which reflects the true cost of
living in a country and the immense purchasing power of countries like China and India.
Figure 2
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Comparing economic growth rates among the five key countries over the past several decades reveals a
large amount of variation across the economies, as illustrated by Figure 4.  Overall, the economies
experienced robust growth throughout most of the 1980s.  In the early 1990s the Japanese economy
stagnated while the rest of the region continued to post relatively rapid economic growth.  In 1997-98
the regional economic crisis sent the economies of Indonesia and Korea into a tailspin, while China and
India remained relatively unscathed.  In recent years, while positive growth has returned to Indonesia, it
is subject to a wide variation as it lurches from one political crisis to the next.  In contrast, Korea’s
economy has posted strong growth, driven largely by buoyant domestic demand and, more recently,
exports.  China’s growth has also remained remarkably robust, led by strong public investment and
export growth.  India’s growth has declined somewhat, as the benefits of earlier structural reform efforts
are beginning to fade.  At the same time, Japan has continued along the path of stagnation and/or decline
and it is experiencing its third recession in the past decade.
Figure 4
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Among the less developed of the Key Players, China and India look set to continue to drive economic
growth in the region.  China’s future growth will depend, in large, on continued structural reforms,
including developing a commercially oriented banking system and pushing forward with the restructuring
of its state enterprises.  While China’s entry into the WTO may come at the cost of some short- to
medium-term adjustments, it should be a boon to its long-term growth prospects.  India’s growth
prospects are tied to continued progress toward privatization, strengthening the financial system, further
opening to trade and foreign investment, and removing restrictions on agricultural and industrial activity.
The country’s fiscal deficit, which is among the highest in the world, is also a source of concern.  If
progress toward reform does not continue, India’s economy could continue to slow.  Finally, Indonesia
is the true wild card in this picture, as its future growth prospects are tied to its precarious political
situation.  We count ourselves among those who are cautiously optimistic about Indonesia’s future
growth prospects.
Turning towards the more developed economies among the Key Players, South Korea should continue
to post solid growth, but it is likely to slow as it transforms itself from an economy playing “catch-up”
into a more mature economy where GDP growth on the order of 5-8 percent is much harder to come
by.  Most project that Japan will return to modest growth, but there is a danger that it will disappoint, as
it has in the past.  To ensure a return to growth, Japan needs to take decisive action to deal with long
standing structural impediments, particularly in the banking sector, where unrecognized nonperforming
loans make banks unwilling to lend.  These problems are well-known, but unfortunately action has been
limited.
Regional Oil Demand Outlook
Robust economic growth is generally linked with increased energy consumption, and this has certainly
been the case in the Asia-Pacific region.  Petroleum product demand grew in the range of 5-6 percent
per year between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s, before dropping off with the 1997-98 regional
economic crisis.  Demand growth has not recovered to these levels, and looking forward it is likely to
remain in the range of 1.5-3 percent per annum, as reflected in Figures 5 and 6.  It should be noted thatKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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part of the region’s slowdown in the growth of oil consumption can be traced to a drop-off in economic
growth in some countries, but part of it must also be attributed to deregulation and important changes in
market structure that has left consumers much more exposed to relatively high oil prices than they were
in the past—a trend that is likely to continue.  Consumers are responding to the recent high oil prices as
might be expected, by reducing demand.
Figure 5
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Figure 7 highlights the outlook for incremental demand growth for each product.  It shows that the
consumption of LPG and naphtha is projected to slow somewhat from the extremely high growth rates
that these products had posted over the past several decades.  As would be expected as the region’s
economies grow and mature, consumption of transport fuels will grow faster than overall consumption.
Gasoline and gasoil account for 55.6, 51.3 and 51.2 percent of incremental growth over the periods
2002-05, 2005-10 and 2010-15, respectively.  Finally, in contrast to other areas of the world, fuel oil
consumption will continue to grow, albeit slowly.
Figure 7





























































Turning the focus towards individual countries, aside from China, the performance of the Asia-Pacific
petroleum market has been disappointing over the past several years.  This year regional demand
growth is projected to return to more “normal” levels, but Japan is the wild card.  If it continues to
decline, regional growth will remain stagnant. Looking further forward, China, India and Indonesia are
set to lead future growth.  As reflected by Figure 8, these countries currently consume less that 0.05
barrels/person/day, so obviously there is a lot of room for growth in the developing countries of the
region.  At the same time, Japan and South Korea average over eight times as much consumption per
capita.  Because their markets are more mature, Japan and South Korea’s role in incremental growth is
likely to be smaller than in the past.  However, as major consumers they still have the potential to




Per-Capita Oil Consumption in Asian Countries (bbl/person/day)
















Figure 9 shows projected incremental demand growth among the Key Players.  China and India are
projected to account for between 50 and 55 percent of regional demand growth over the periods
2002-2005, 2005-2010, and 2010-2015.
Figure 9

























































Over the past several years the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed dramatic developments in the
downstream sector.  Between 1999 and 2001 approximately 2.5 mmb/d of CDU capacity came on
line, mostly in China, India and Taiwan.  These additions coincided with relatively high crude prices and
weak product demand, and consequently they had a tremendous negative impact on refining margins in
the region.
Figure 10 shows that the Key Players dominate the regional refining scene.  Japan’s high ratio of
desulfurization to CDU capacity, as illustrated by Figure 11, can be traced to the fact that it imports
large volumes of sour Middle Eastern crudes.  In contrast, China’s refineries are geared towards heavy
sweet domestic crudes, and thus the cracking to CDU ratio is almost double the Asia average, as
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It is important to remember that while steps have been taken towards deregulation, most of the Asian
refineries continue to operate in protected conditions, as discussed in detail in the country sections.  For
example, in China and India, refiners receive protection via the structure of import duties on crude and
products, where the duty on crude is lower than products.  As a consequence, they often enjoy healthy
margins, even when refining margins are negative for those operating in the free market.  In IndonesiaKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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there is also heavy market intervention in that Indonesian refiners enjoy a guaranteed rate of return.
Japan and South Korea’s refiners do not enjoy the protection of a formal tariff-based mechanism, but
their market structures make it very difficult for outside competitors to establish refineries or import
products.
Regional Crude and Product Balances Outlook
Most Asia-Pacific producers consume their crude production domestically.  For example, in 2002
almost 70 percent of the crude produced in the various Asian countries was consumed within the same
country.  China is by far the region’s largest producer, at 3,401 kb/d in 2002, followed by Indonesia at
1,318 kb/d.  Among the other Key Players, India is the region’s fourth largest producer (659 kb/d).
Looking forward, China’s production is projected to increase, but this increase will be counteracted by
declines in Indonesia, Australia and Malaysia, so that overall regional crude output is projected to
decline.  India’s production is stable, but growth will remain sluggish unless India adopts a more open
foreign investment policy in the upstream oil sector.
Currently, the Asia-Pacific region imports approximately 11 mmb/d of oil. With domestic production
projected to remain flat, Asian imports will grow in the future—imports of 14-16 mmb/d are possible
towards the end of the decade.  Japan is the region’s largest importer, followed by South Korea, India,
and China.  Indonesia sits in the number six position, as indicated by Figure 13.  Of this group, Japan
has the heaviest dependence on Middle Eastern oil and Indonesia has the lowest, as reflected in Figure
14.  Overall, Middle Eastern oil accounts for over 75 percent of the region’s imports.  At the same time,
Asia is the Middle East’s largest customer, accounting for over 60 percent of the crude exported from
the region.  Given current trends in production and consumption, it is clear that these two regions will
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Regional Policy Trends
Among the policy trends that will drive the oil industry in the Asia-Pacific region are continued
deregulation and privatization, as discussed in the individual country sections, as well as ever-tightening
product specifications.  Figure 15 highlights changes in diesel specifications.  Some of the Key Players,
such as South Korea and Japan, have already attained .05 percent sulfur for automotive diesel, and
Japan aims to move to .005 percent by 2005.  At the same time, while China and Indonesia are contentKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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to remain at .20 and .50 percent, respectively, through 2005, India has ambitious plans to lower sulfur
to .05 percent.
Transition of Automobile Diesel Specification* in Asia














*Percent weight of Sulfur
Transition from 1998 to 2005
Current range
Figure 15
Based on recent developments in treating/desulfurization infrastructure, Asian refiners are generally
capable of achieving these specifications.  A longer-run impact of tightening product specifications is that
inter-regional trade of products could emerge as Asia’s specifications converge with the U.S. and
European markets.  This could help ease the product surplus which currently prevails in the Asia-Pacific
market.
China
By any standard, China’s energy sector is huge.  The world’s most populous country ranks second in
total primary commercial energy consumption after the United States, and third in primary energy
production after the United States and Russia. China’s primary energy consumption declined for two
consecutive years in 1997 and 1998, mainly because of a drop in coal consumption.  Although coalKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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consumption continued to decline in 1999 and 2000, due to strong demand for oil and natural gas, the
overall growth of total primary energy use was positive between 1998 and 2001.
Table 1
Key Indicators for China's Petroleum Sector, 1995-2002
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
Crude Production (million b/d) 3.00    3.14    3.21    3.21    3.21    3.24    3.30    3.41   
Oil Consumption (million b/d) 3.16    3.41    3.79    3.87    4.22    4.54    4.65    4.81   
Annual Growth Rate 8.0%   7.9%   11.1%   2.3%   8.8%   7.6%   2.4%   3.4%  
Refining Thruput (million b/d) 2.19    3.01    3.32    3.31    3.67    4.20    4.20    4.39   
Crude Oil Imports (kb/d) 342    457    709    546    732    1,399    1,205    1,388   
Crude Oil Exports (kb/d) 377    407    397    312    143    208    151    144   
Product Imports (kb/d) 364    422    593    624    620    522    592    646   
-LPG 74    113    115    152    176    153    155    199   
-Gasoil 125    94    152    103    26    21    15    15   
-Fuel Oil 121    175    252    299    323    260    333    303   
-Others 43    40    74    70    95    88    89    129   
Product Exports (kb/d) 110    120    157    146    176    220    247    266   
-Gasoline 43    31    42    42    96    106    134    143   
-Kero/jet 8    16    16    20    27    38    34    34   
-Gasoil 27    32    47    20    12    12    5    26   
-Others 32    41    53    63    41    63    74    63   
Notes: *Preliminary
Overall, coal dominates China’s primary energy consumption, as indicated by Figure 16.  Oil is the
second-largest source of primary energy consumption in China, and it is obviously extremely important
to the economy.  China’s growing dependence on imported oil is of increasing concern to the Chinese
government, and it has led to a hot debate over China’s future energy security.  Natural gas currently
has a minor share of total primary energy consumption in China, but its importance is growing.  In
comparison to other countries, nuclear power was a late starter in China’s energy development, but it
has expanded rapidly in recent years.  Finally, hydropower has traditionally been given priority status,
and thus construction of hydropower plants has proceeded relatively quickly over the past several
decades.
With five decades of development, China has established a full-fledged oil industry that plays an
important role in China’s social, economic, and energy development.  Globally, China is one of the
largest oil producers, refiners, and consumers in the world.  It ranks fifth in crude oil production (afterKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Iran) and third in both petroleum product consumption
(after the United States and Japan) and oil refining capacity (after the United States and Russia).
Figure 16
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Although structural and market reforms started in the early 1980s and much progress has been made,
the petroleum industry is still one of the most heavily protected industries in China.  Until the late 1990s,
progress in reforming the management system overseeing China’s petroleum industry had been slow.
Through the state oil companies, the government continued to have a firm grasp on the entire petroleum
industry—ranging from upstream exploration, development, and production to downstream refining and
marketing.  Recently this has changed, as reform has accelerated since the late 1990s, particularly with
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001.
Oil Production
Prior to 1998, China’s upstream and downstream sectors were largely split between
CNPC/PetroChina and Sinopec, respectively.  Although the 1998 reorganization has restructured
CNPC/PetroChina and Sinopec into two integrated oil companies, China’s onshore oil production isKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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still dominated by CNPC/PetroChina.  In 2001, China produced 3.3 million b/d of crude oil, up from
2.1 million b/d in 1980 and 2.8 million b/d in 1990.
The majority of China's crude oil is produced onshore, but the share of offshore production has been
increasing rapidly, from 1.0 percent in 1990, to 5.7 percent in 1995 and 11.4 percent in 2001.
Offshore crude production accounted for about two-thirds of the country's net incremental output during
the period of 1990-2001.
In 2001, about 31 percent of crude production was from the Daqing oil field.  At present, the second
largest oil field is the Shengli oil field and the third largest is the Liaohe oil field.  Altogether, output from
these three fields accounted for 56 percent of China’s total oil production in 2001, down from 74
percent in 1990.
Crude output from Xinjiang Autonomous Region in the West, which includes production from three
major basins—Tarim, Junggar, and Turpan-Hami—increased from 139 kb/d in 1990 to 339 kb/d in
2001. In fact, Xinjiang was the largest contributor to China's incremental onshore production during this
period, followed by the Ordos basin in the Northwest.
The Refining Sector
Prior to the 1998 reorganization, Sinopec dominated China’s refining sector, but CNPC/PetroChina
had a sizable refining capacity comprised mainly of small to medium refineries.  After the reorganization,
CNPC/PetroChina’s downstream position has been enhanced.
At the start of 2002, China had approximately 5.6 million b/d of crude distillation capacity (although up
to 300 kb/d of locally-owned small refineries cannot be fully identified), up from 3.1 million b/d at the
beginning of the 1990s.  In 2001, crude runs in China reached 4.2 million b/d, up from 1.6 million b/d in
1980 and 2.2 million b/d in 1990.
As far as refinery configurations are concerned, the Chinese refining sector is distinguished by the
following characteristics: (1) large overall crude distillation capacity, but relatively small refineries; (2)
high fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) and resid catalytic cracking (RCC) capacity; (3) uneven distributionKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
 
21
of refining facilities among different regions; (4) low catalytic reforming capacity; and (5) low utilization
rate.  Several of these characteristics are much more pronounced at CNPC/PetroChina, since the
markets within its geographical area are much smaller than that of Sinopec.
It is important to note that China is under pressure to increase its sour-crude processing capacity to deal
with increasing Middle East crude imports and the declining availability of sweet crudes within the Asia-
Pacific region. Under these circumstances, Sinopec has a huge government-approved plan underway to
upgrade its refineries and increase its sour-crude handling capacity by 400-600 kb/d over the next five
years.
Petroleum Product Demand and Oil Trade
China’s petroleum product demand is characterized by spectacular growth—especially since the early
1990s—and a radical transformation of the consumption pattern, as illustrated by Figure 17.  In 2001,
China’s petroleum product demand of 4.6 million b/d (including the direct use of crude oil in the
industrial sector and for power generation) was the second largest in the Asia-Pacific region after Japan.
Over the past two decades (1980-2001), petroleum product demand growth has averaged 5.2 percent
per annum, and most recently growth has accelerated to 7.0 percent per year, on average, since the
1990s.
Figure 17
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China’s crude and product exports peaked in the mid 1980s at 600 kb/d and 125 kb/d, respectively,
but have since declined.  In the meantime, imports of crude, and to a lesser extent, products have
rapidly increased.  China has become a net overall oil importer since 1993.  In 2001 net imports
reached just under 1.4 million b/d and surged to over 1.6 million b/d in 2002, as indicated by Figure 18.
China is still a crude exporter, but the volume is much smaller today than it was a decade ago.
Figure 18


















China’s oil price reform efforts date back nearly twenty years, when the first moves were made to raise
prices that were well below the international market.  The current pricing regime took root in June 1998
when China established a formula to link domestic gasoline and diesel prices with Singapore market
prices.  However, China, failed to implement the pricing formula for over a year, until October 1999.
Full implementation of the new pricing regime on a monthly basis started only in May 2000, and from
May 2000 to September 2001 China’s prices were largely linked to the formula.  Starting in October
2001, China modified the price formula to include elements of market prices in New York and
Rotterdam, in addition to Singapore prices.  The new price system has resulted in less frequent
adjustments of domestic prices.Key Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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Prior to October 2001, the pricing regime had the following features: (1) The State Development
Planning Commission (SDPC) set baseline retail prices, as well as baseline ex-refinery prices which
applied to direct supplies of refined products to large and state designated special users, including the
railway companies and the military, among others.  (2) CNPC/PetroChina and Sinopec set their final
specific retail prices within a 10 percent band of the baseline retail price (5 percent above and below the
baseline).  (3) CNPC/PetroChina and Sinopec also set their ex-refinery prices to the market, which in
most cases was the same as the SDPC-set price at the refinery gate. (4) CNPC/PetroChina and
Sinopec set the wholesale prices, where the retail-wholesale differential was a minimum of 5.5 percent.
(5) SDPC’s baseline retail prices were adjusted every month based on the previous month’s Singapore
price changes.
Since October 2001 baseline prices have been calculated based on a basket of Singapore, Rotterdam,
and New York prices, with the weights of the three markets kept secret and changing.  Instead of
monthly changes, SDPC now keeps the retail baseline prices within a band.  Only when large enough
changes occur to the basket price will SDPC opt to change the baseline retail gasoline and diesel prices.
CNPC/PetroChina and Sinopec also have more flexibility.  They can now determine their own specific
final prices within 16 percent of the baseline retail prices set by SDPC (8 percent above and 8 percent
below the baseline price).
WTO and China
Following China’s entry into WTO in December 2001, the country’s major concessions and obligations
for reform in the petroleum sector are in the areas of oil trade and domestic oil marketing.   These
include:
•  Crude imports (tariff): Effective January 1, 2002, the import tariff was reduced from 16 Yuan
(US$1.93) per metric ton (tonne) to zero.
•  Crude imports (import quota): Starting in 2002, China agreed to increase the crude import
quota by 15 percent for ten years and renegotiate thereafter.  For 2002, a minimum 144 kb/dKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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crude oil import quota needs be allocated to non-state oil companies (the actual allocation was
165.6 kb/d).
•  Product imports (tariff): In varying degrees, import tariffs have been reduced since January 1,
2002.  The tariff rates are: LPG: 3 percent (down from 6%); Naphtha: 6 percent (unchanged);
Gasoline: 5 percent (down from 9%); Kerosene and jet fuel: 9 percent (unchanged); Diesel: 6
percent (unchanged); Fuel oil: 6 percent (unchanged).
•  Product imports (import quota): Starting 2002, the refined product import quota is to be
increased by 15 percent for two years and abolished by January 1, 2004.  In 2002 and 2003, a
minimum of 20 percent of the import quota is to be allocated to non-state oil companies.  After
the quota is abolished, only licensed and qualified traders, including foreign traders, can import
major refined products.
The specific situation for 2002 and 2003 can be summarized as follows:
•  For 2002, China issued 165.6 kb/d of crude oil import quota to ten non-state oil companies.  It
also issued a total refined product import quota of 420 kb/d, 80 percent assigned to the
designated state oil trading companies and the rest to non-state oil companies.
•  For 2003, China issued 190.4 kb/d of crude oil import quota to ten non-state oil companies, up
15 percent from the non-state oil company quota in 2002.  It also issued a total import quota of
about 483 kb/d for major petroleum products, up 15 percent from the quota in 2002.  As in
2002, 20 percent of the quota will be allocated to non-state oil trading companies.
China’s major concessions and obligations under the WTO for retail market entry, include the following:
•  The retail market for oil products will be open to foreign firms after the first three years under
the WTO.
•  The wholesale market for refined products will be open after five years under WTO.
•  During these three and five year transitional periods, gradual opening may be implemented.Key Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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Our overall assessment regarding China’s implementation of the WTO obligations is that in general the
process will be slow.  The state oil companies will find every chance to fight the implementation,
particularly when their interest is at stake.  In spite of this opposition, the process will steadily move
forward as the government appears to be determined to comply with the WTO rules as much as
possible.  In the end, a delay in fully complying with WTO rules is likely, but the state oil companies will
eventually subject themselves to increased competition in a freer market under WTO.
Outlook for Oil Demand, Supply, and Trade
Looking forward, China’s petroleum sector is expected to change dramatically over the next ten to
fifteen years.  On the supply side, crude production growth within China is expected to be flat.  At the
same time, petroleum product demand growth is likely to be strong.  The net result is a continuously
rising import requirement for oil over the long term.
Our base-case forecasts indicate that total oil consumption (petroleum product demand plus direct use
of crude) in China will grow at an average annual rate of 3.4 percent during the period 2000-2015.
Consumption is projected to reach 6.3 million b/d in 2010 and 7.4 million b/d by 2015, as indicated by
Figure 19.  Of course, these projections are sensitive to alternative assumptions under different
scenarios.
As for the refining industry, expansion is under way to raise the country’s capability to handle sour crude
from the Middle East.  In recent years, because of concerns about the low utilization rate of the existing
refineries, the government has imposed restrictions on new refinery projects and foreign investment in
the refining sector.  However, foreign investment in refinery-petrochemical integration projects is still
encouraged.
Overall, as domestic production continues to lag behind demand, China’s net oil (including both oil and
products) import requirement is expected to surge to 1.8 million b/d in 2005, 2.7 million b/d in 2010,
and 3.7 million b/d by 2015, as shown by Figure 20.  Between 70 and 85 percent of the imports are
likely to be crude while the rest will be refined products.  The role of the Middle East in producing




















Note: Data are actual for 2000-01 and preliminary for 2002.
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Because of a continuous rise in oil imports and price volatility in the global oil markets, energy security is
an increasing concern among Chinese energy policy makers.  While China has not yet established a full-
ranged energy security policy framework, the following has emerged as the main elements of the policy:
•  To enhance domestic oil and gas E&P activities and maximize oil and gas production.Key Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
 
27
•  To diversify sources of oil and gas imports, increasing the share of oil and gas imports from
Russia and Central Asia.
•  To strengthen overseas investment by state oil companies, particularly in the Middle East, Asia-
Pacific, Russia, and Central Asia.
•  To undertake different trading methods to avoid transaction risks.
•  To increase investment in an oil and gas infrastructure and open more channels to imports.
•  To establish a national or strategic petroleum storage.
Of these policy elements, the promotion of overseas oil and gas investment by state oil companies has
taken center stage at present.  China’s overseas upstream oil and gas investment began in the early
1990s and increased dramatically in 1997 when CNPC signed a series of investment contracts in
Venezuela, Kazakhstan, and Sudan.  The search for investments cooled during the 1998-99 period
because of depressed international oil prices, but it has surged again since 2000.
Currently, six state-owned oil companies plus one state-owned non-oil company in China have
overseas upstream departments: CNPC, PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC, Sinochem, and CITIC
(China International Trust and Investment Corp.).  CNPC is dominant in China’s overseas oil and gas
investments, but CNOOC is also active.  Sinopec and PetroChina are trying to catch up and Sinochem
is a late comer, followed by CITIC.   The state oil companies are active in a number of areas, including:
•  CNPC: Kazakhstan, Peru, Sudan, Venezuela, and possibly Iraq, etc.
•  CNOOC: Indonesia and others.
•  Sinopec: Iran and others.
•  CITIC/Sunwing Energy JV: Interest in the Middle East and Africa.
With massive investment (often overspending), CNPC has managed to establish 250 kb/d of overseas
crude and 71 mmcf/d of natural gas producing capacity.  In 2001, CNPC’s equity oil reached 166
kb/d, up from 110 kb/d in 2000.  CNPC’s target is to have 360 kb/d of overseas equity oil by 2005.
Sinopec plans to invest up to US$10 billion in the overseas upstream oil sector during the first half ofKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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this decade, raising its overseas equity oil to 40 to 60 kb/d by 2005.  On an overall basis, it is estimated
that up to 600 kb/d of overseas equity oil may be acquired by all Chinese state oil companies by 2005.
India
Turning to India, it should be emphasized that almost 40 percent of India’s energy needs are currently
fulfilled by combustible waste/renewable forms of fuel, which includes burning wood and biomass.  As
the country develops and moves away from these types of fuels, the potential for growth in oil
consumption is huge.  This section of the report provides a brief overview of India’s oil industry,
including highlights of the progress that has been made towards deregulation and privatization.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
Crude Production (kb/d) 707 665 682 665 658 645 648 666
Oil Consumption (kb/d) 1,529         1,660         1,765         1,878         2,031         2,059         2,062         2,065        
6.5% 8.5% 6.4% 6.4% 8.2% 1.4% 0.1% 0.1%
Refining Thruput (kb/d) 1,169         1,241         1,301         1,336         1,589         1,996         2,152         2,190        
Crude Oil Imports (kb/d)
1
627            579            624            597            931            1,351         1,504         1,524        
Crude Oil Exports (kb/d) 0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0   
Product Imports (kb/d) 390 451 488 516 438 271 196 154
-LPG 20 36 40 54 61 34 26 44
-Gasoil 226 278 285 233 138 35 0 0
-Fuel Oil 17 25 15 27 18 29 19 31
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Product Exports (kb/d) 61 62 53 24 24 102 159 182
-Gasoline 0 0 0 0 2 13 49 64
-Gasoil 4 4 5 0 6 44 55 60
Notes: *Preliminary; 
1
1999 onwards is calculated from crude runs and domestic production
Table 2
Key Indicators for India's Petroleum Sector, 1995-2002Key Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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Transforming an Industry: Deregulation and Privatization
Over the past several years India’s oil industry has initiated a number of major reforms with mixed
results.  In April 2002 the government dissolved its administered pricing mechanism (APM), which
resulted in a partial decontrol of domestic prices of petroleum products.  In principle, the oil marketing
companies—all of which are government owned—are now allowed to revise their sale prices in line
with international oil prices.  In practice, however, they still require the ministry’s agreement to do so.
In 2002 the process of privatizing state-owned downstream oil companies was also initiated.  IBP Ltd.,
a small downstream operator, was the first to be sold, but it was sold to Indian Oil Corporation
(IOC)—the country’s largest government-owned downstream company—so this was really a case of
one government company acquiring another, not privatization.  Plans to privatize two state-owned
downstream companies, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL) through a sell-off to a strategic
partner, and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) through a public offering, were also
announced at this time.  Initially the process met little success due to controversy amongst various
government departments and ministries, but recently it looks set to move forward.  The government has
invited bids for the sale of a 35 percent share and management control of HPCL.  There are indications
that the public offering of BPCL will be executed through both foreign and domestic channels, though
the exact details have not been formalized.
It should be noted that an important issue for the private sector giant, Reliance Petroleum Ltd. (RPL),
under deregulation, is to secure access to retail outlets for domestic sales, which makes RPL a front
runner in bidding for a controlling share in HPCL.  Another local contender is the state-run crude
producer Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC), which seeks to become an integrated oil
major, although recent reports suggest that the government has banned state-owned domestic
companies from bidding.  ONGC has a monopoly on domestic production of crude and gained the right
to market oil products after the April 2002 deregulation.  Both ONGC and RPL satisfy the
government’s conditions on selling petroleum products in the country.  This calls for a minimum
investment of US$450 million in the downstream sector.  The investment must be in the form of refining
or distribution infrastructure, and any investment in developing a retail network is not counted.Key Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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Alternatively, the company must produce at least 3 mmtpa.  It is being recommended that IOC not be
allowed to participate in the bidding for BPCL and/or HPCL in an effort to avoid an all-out monopoly.
An additional factor that will become increasingly important in a fully deregulated scenario is access to
distribution and storage infrastructures.  A company that has a monopoly on these facilities can gain an
unfair advantage over other players.  A major step in addressing this concern was the creation of
Petronet India in 1998.  This company will manage distribution and storage infrastructure developed
after 1998.  These facilities, will in principle, be managed under common-carrier rule, allowing access
for all refiners in the country.
In summary, developments in India’s privatization process are being watched keenly, as the stakes are
high for everyone involved.  For the government, its future credibility is at stake.  For domestic players
like Reliance Petroleum, this is an opportunity to gain access to the retail market.  Finally, for foreign
investors it is the chance to obtain a slice of the Indian market.  Although these changes appear to be
dramatic, it must be remembered that the government has no plans to cede control of IOC, ONGC and
GAIL, which currently dominate the downstream oil, upstream oil, and gas sectors, respectively.
Therefore, even with the loss of some control over HPCL and BPCL, the government will continue to
exercise its influence over the country’s oil and gas sector.
Downstream Facts and Issues
Currently, over 2.2 mmb/d of refining capacity is installed in India (based on CDU capacity).  Of this,
1.02 mmb/d is owned by IOC and 0.54 mmb/d is owned by RPL.  The rest is distributed amongst
HPCL, BPCL, and other companies.
RPL’s Jamnagar refinery often enjoys a competitive edge over other players as the plant has substantial
conversion and treating capacity, which gives it the flexibility to use a wide variety of crude grades.
However, access to retail sites remains a major issue for privately held RPL, as all of the retail sites are
owned by IOC, BPCL, and HPCL.  IOC and RPL have a product off-take agreement, which RPL
uses to sell products from its refinery.  The original terms of the agreement were take-or-pay in favor of
RPL, i.e., IOC was bound to buy specified volumes of RPL products and sell these through its retailKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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sites.  IOC was unhappy with this situation, and in early 2002 the company renegotiated the terms of the
contract.  It is quite likely that this arrangement will be discontinued in the future, which creates a sense
of urgency for RPL to find a way to market its domestic sales.  One of the leading options is for RPL to
develop its own retail network.  Alternatively, RPL could purchase HPCL, as discussed previously.
It is important to note that India’s refining capacity (in terms of CDU capacity) doubled between 1995
and 2001, transforming the country from a major importer of middle distillates to a net exporter of these
products, as depicted by Figure 21.  Almost 1 mmb/d of refining capacity came online in 1999 alone.
This includes the 540 kb/d Reliance refinery at Jamnagar, over 200 kb/d of IOC refineries across
different locations, plus additions from Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Ltd.  Finally little over 100 kb/d of capacity was added at two IOC plants in 2001.
Figure 21
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These refining capacity additions were planned at a time when oil product demand was growing at rates
exceeding 5-6 percent per annum, but by the time the additions materialized demand growth had
diminished to 1-2 percent per annum.  This resulted in overall petroleum product surpluses, forcing
existing refiners to find export markets for their products.  Furthermore, this situation led to the
cancellation and delay of some planned refineries, resulting in losses of millions of dollars.
While demand growth has slowed, Indian refiners continue to prosper under the umbrella of tariff
protection, which is derived from the differential between petroleum product and crude import duties.
Although the level of crude and product import duty has been reduced over the past few years, the
differential has increased to over 7 percent overall, as illustrated by Figure 22.  Since 1999 the importKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
 
32
duty on crude has been reduced from 22 percent to 10 percent.  Similarly, the import duty on a number
of products has been reduced from 32 percent to current levels of 20 percent.
Figure 22





















These differentials have enabled Indian refiners to enjoy positive margins even at times when the
market-driven Singapore margins have been negative.  For instance, throughout 2001 Indian refining
margins were at least US$1.00/b and US$1.50/b higher than Singapore margins for hydroskimming and
cracking yields, respectively.  This tax policy has far reaching effects.  Due to the guaranteed high
returns, Indian refiners operate under high utilization rates, which in turn worsens the regional product
surplus.
It should be pointed out that the level of import duties and the crude/product differential has been a
source of some debate among finance and petroleum ministries over the years.  The finance ministry has
pressed for lower differentials, which is in line with the overall policy of deregulation of the downstream
sector.  At the same time, it argues that the tariff level should be held at a reasonably high level to ensure
revenue inflow, part of which is used to fund subsidies on petroleum products (LPG and kerosene).  In
contrast, the petroleum ministry has argued for higher differentials in an effort to support the industry.
In this context, the finance ministry’s recently appointed advisory panel on taxes and tariffs is proposing
a reduction in import duties on crude to 8 percent for the 2003/4 fiscal year, and further down to 5
percent for 2004/5.  Similarly, the panel is advising a reduction of import duties for refined products toKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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15 percent and 10 percent for the same years.  If approved, this could lower the effective rate of
protection to 5 percent over the next two years.
Upstream Facts and Issues
Currently, approximately 650 kb/d of crude is produced in India, half of which is the light Bombay High
grade.  In addition, approximately 100 kb/d comes from fields in Assam and 125 kb/d from fields in
Gujarat—with the remaining production coming from various other fields.  All of these crudes are
refined domestically, as there are no exports.  ONGC, which is the major producer of these grades,
sells this crude mainly to state-owned refiners IOC, BPCL, and HPCL.
On the whole, over half of India’s crude requirement is fulfilled through imports from the Middle East.
Domestic crudes account for about 30 percent of the total crude requirement, and the remainder is
imported from the Atlantic Basin and other Asian countries.    The Atlantic Basin crudes include the
relatively sweet grades from West Africa plus the heavier South American grades.  RPL imports its
complete requirement (approximately 600 kb/d) of crude and prefers heavier grades to take advantage
of the high conversion capability at its refinery.
Under the APM, the price of domestic crude was capped at US$16/b.  It was thought that ONGC
would be one of the instant beneficiaries of the April 2002 deregulation as it would, in principle, be
allowed to price its crude at an international level.  After deregulation ONGC raised prices by
approximately US$5/b, but 50 percent of this increment was taken away as a tax on domestic crude so
parity with global crude prices was not realized.  It is thought that over the next fiscal year ONGC will
be able to realize complete parity with global crude prices.
This transition will not be straightforward, however, as refiners and ONGC have yet to reach a
consensus over the formula for pricing domestic crude to the domestic refiners.  ONGC seeks a quality-
premium for its crude, and has indicated that it will revise crude prices on a monthly basis—in line with
changes in international prices.  Furthermore, ONGC is set on adding a freight component to the prices,
based on freight cost from West Africa to India.  It remains to be seen whether ONGC will be able toKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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push these changes through.  In the meantime, ONGC is also lobbying for approval to export the crude
it produces.
As a final note, India’s oil industry deregulation has brought an end to IOC procuring crude on behalf of
HPCL and BPCL.  As a consequence, these two refiners can hunt for preferential deals on their own,
which is certainly an added attraction for potential buyers.
Overseas Investment Strategy
Historically India’s overseas investment strategy has been quite limited, but in recent years the country
has become much more aggressive in overseas exploration and acquisition.  ONGC, which is India’s
largest state-owned exploration and production company, has ambitious plans for expansion both
domestically and overseas (through its international arm, ONGC Videsh Ltd.).  The company is moving
to reverse its recent decline in oil production, which has dropped from a high of 632 kb/d in the mid
1990s to approximately 500 kb/d at present.  ONGC aspires to double its reserves over the next five
years, and to accomplish this goal it is aggressively moving to acquire assets from within India and
abroad.
Among the deals that ONGC has in the works is a bid for some of the assets of Cairn Energy in both
India and Bangladesh.  ONGC is also in the process of acquiring a 25 percent share in Talisman
Energy’s Greater Nile Oil Project in Sudan for about US$750 million, as well as a 20 percent share of
Russia’s Sakhalin I project for US$1.7 billion.  It was recently awarded an exploration block in Syria
and is currently negotiating with a wide array of countries including Myanmar, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Kazakhstan and the U.S. for equity oil and gas.
Indonesia
Indonesia has the lowest oil consumption among the Key Players, but as a major regional producer and
the largest exporter, its central importance in the Asia-Pacific oil market is assured.  In October 2001Key Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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Indonesia passed the new Oil and Gas Law which ended Pertamina’s monopoly over the nation’s oil
market.  Indonesia suffers from a variety of problems and challenges, many of which the Oil and Gas
Law aims to correct.  These challenges include: prices that are out of alignment with the world market; a
demand barrel that is distorted relative to supply, with a major bulge in middle distillate demand;
burdensome subsidies aimed at maintaining low product prices; and a legacy of investments that have
arguably been misdirected, with investment capital now all but unavailable.  Under these circumstances,
the impetus for the new Oil and Gas Law is obvious.
Key Indicators for Indonesia's Petroleum Sector, 1995-2002
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
Oil Production (kb/d) 1,605 1,601 1,581 1,556 1,500 1,414 1,344 1,272
 - Crude Oil 1,434 1,428 1,418 1,401 1,351 1,272 1,214 1,142
 - Condensate 171 173 163 155 149 142 130 130
Oil Consumption (kb/d)  820 882 979 923 978 1,050 1,076 1,096
Annual Growth Rate 8.0%   7.6%   11.0%   -5.7%   5.9%   7.4%   2.5%   1.8%  
Refining Thruput (kb/d)  807 936 911 931 922 995 990 998
Crude Oil Imports (kb/d) 187 196 172 199 232 204 309 343
Crude Oil Exports (kb/d) 827 777 791 768 782 610 662 628
Product Imports (kb/d) 148 176 297 150 211 247 275 297
- Gasoil 68 97 152 87 104 112 136 166
- Kerosene 37 41 60 22 49 51 47 50
- HSFO 11 32 51 27 37 32 20 25
Product Exports (kb/d) 
1
164 166 175 143 152 183 152 161
- LSWR 141 138 140 123 109 125 98 98
Notes: * Preliminary; 
1 Excluding LPG.
Table 3
Looking Forward: Important Issues
At present Pertamina has a monopoly on downstream oil activity in Indonesia from refining through the
wholesale and distribution levels (with some minor exceptions, such as the lube oil market), as depicted
in Figure 23.  It should be noted that imports of finished products are subject to a tariff of 5 percent,
while there is no tariff on imported crude.
In the retail market Pertamina’s presence is relatively minor, accounting for less than two percent of the
service stations.  The remainder is owned by national companies, small firms, and individuals (all
domestic).  Although Pertamina owns relatively few retail outlets, as the only wholesaler and the entity
that awards retail business licenses, its control is considerable.  With the passage of the Oil and GasKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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Law, Pertamina’s dominant downstream position will soon be curtailed, although the exact nature of the
reforms is still under discussion.

















*based on GP II & smaller
On the upstream side, Pertamina’s licensing rights ended with the passage of the Oil and Gas Law.
Production-sharing contracts are now overseen by a government body, BP Migas.
When considering the potential for competition in the market under the new Oil and Gas Law it is
important to focus on transport and storage.  Although Pertamina is responsible for virtually all national
transport of petroleum products, Pertamina’s own fleet is small and most of the tonnage is chartered.
Pertamina’s position in shipping should not present a major barrier to new entrants, who are free to use
their own shipping, or even to take over charters from Pertamina if Pertamina’s fleet proves to be too
large in the new market.  While shipping itself may not present a barrier to new entrants, access to
terminals, ports, buoying facilities, etc., may present significant barriers.  Pertamina controls about 85
percent of product tankage at more than 200 depots and terminals around the country.
Both the IMF and the World Bank have identified energy pricing as the most pressing issue in the
reform of Indonesia’s oil and gas sector.  It is clear that artificially low energy prices cause many
distortions in the economy.  Over the years, massive amounts of capital have been devoted to building
the facilities needed to match Indonesia’s demand pattern and government revenue has been forgone toKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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maintain low prices.  Attempts to bring prices more in line with the global market have had mixed
results, and the most recent price increases were abandoned under protest.
Looking downstream, Indonesia’s refineries differ widely in size and sophistication.  At one time, after
major cracking expansions in the early 1980s, Indonesia had one of the most sophisticated refining
sectors in the region.  Today Indonesia is still ahead of much of the pack—including other ASEAN
members—but its cracking capacity is now slightly below the regional average.  At present, expansion
plans are limited.
In gross terms, Indonesia’s refining capacity is roughly equal to the nation’s product demand.  Through
judicious crude selection and use of upgraded facilities, Indonesia manages to squeeze a GKD
(gasoline, kerosene, diesel) yield of 70 percent from an average barrel of crude.  Unfortunately, this is
not enough to satisfy domestic demand—GKD is 81 percent of the demand barrel.  Overall, there is a
surplus of fuel oil, a large shortage of diesel, and moderate shortages of gasoline and kerosene.  Thus,
Indonesia is chronically short of expensive “spec” products, such as gasoline and middle distillates, and
long on lower-value fuel oil, naphtha, and LPG.
On the upstream side, because new finds have not off-set the inevitable declines in the older producing
fields, Indonesia’s crude and condensate production have been in decline since the mid 1990s.  This
situation has been exacerbated somewhat by security problems in some producing areas, most notably
the Riau provinces, where Indonesia’s two largest crude oil streams—Minas and Duri—are located.
New finds, such as the Belanak and Cepu fields, and enhanced security will help stem the decline.
However, due to the uncertainty surrounding the new Oil and Gas Law and the potentially radical shifts
in the market that may come with it, investment in new exploration and production activities has fallen.
With mature fields and fewer attractive prospects available, Indonesia will likely have to offer more




Indonesia does not have a government strategy for overseas investment.  A local private company,
Medco Energy International, has some limited operations outside of Indonesia, including Central Asia
and Myanmar.
Japan
While Japan plays an important role as a major oil consumer in the Asia-Pacific region, it is acting as a
drag on the region’s incremental demand growth.  In 2002 the country posted its third consecutive year
of negative growth in petroleum product consumption.  Unless Japan emerges from its prolonged
economic recession, demand growth—particularly in the industrial sector—is projected to remain
stagnant.  It should be noted that a series of nuclear reactor shutdowns related to safety concerns led to
unexpected demand growth beginning in September 2002.  However, because direct crude burning and
fuel oil generally play a swing role in satisfying power demand fluctuations, demand will probably decline
as the nuclear reactors come back online.  If the reactors remain down for an extended period, LNG
may be substituted for oil.
Key Indicators for Japan's Petroleum Sector, 1995-2002
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
Oil Consumption (kb/d) 5,601 5,650 5,589 5,384 5,467 5,392 5,231 5,165
Annual Growth Rate 3.0% 0.9% -1.1% -3.7% 1.6% -1.4% -3.0% -1.3%
Refining Thruput (kb/d) 4,169 4,180 4,319 4,213 4,150 4,145 4,108 4,043
Crude Oil Imports (kb/d) 4,598 4,540 4,681 4,391 4,315 4,307 4,257 4,060
Product Imports (kb/d) 1,278 1,320 1,235 1,141 1,223 1,233 1,134 1,131
-LPG 462 473 481 456 449 460 441 428
-Naphtha 473 497 487 469 517 535 485 502
-Gasoline 25 25 25 16 24 28 20 29
-Kero/Jet 121 142 98 89 93 70 51 54
-Gasoil 49 50 26 28 42 47 40 35
-Fuel Oil 77 68 43 19 32 28 30 31
Product Exports (kb/d) 184 152 176 147 108 74 91 78
-LPG - - - - 4 1 1 3
-Naphtha 6 6 6 3 5 3 1 2
-Gasoline 20 12 13 14 14 4 8 4
-Kero/Jet 9 11 5 19 15 10 14 15
-Gasoil 61 43 59 46 43 37 40 28
-Fuel Oil 74 73 79 54 15 15 13 13
Table 4




Japan’s downstream oil industry is suffering from several major problems which are crippling the
industry.  The first is stagnant demand, as discussed above.  There is obviously little the refiners can do
by themselves to rekindle the economy to encourage demand growth.  The second challenge is a weak
regional market with very low margins.  Again, there is little that Japan’s domestic refiners can do on
their own to rectify this problem.  The final set of challenges is a relatively high cost structure, a large
debt burden, and a large number of small, inefficient refineries and retail stations—quite simply, a large
part of Japan’s downstream sector is not internationally competitive.  Japan’s oil industry has been
moving to address this last set of challenges, albeit slowly and somewhat half-heartedly.
Following the crisis of 1998 the Japanese oil industry consolidated into four main groups, as presented
in Figure 24.
Figure 24
Classification of Japanese Oil Refiners
(kb/d)
as of April 2003 






Showa Shell Group (479.0)
alliance with
Japan Energy and Affiliates (532.1)
Tonen General Group and Affiliates
(704)
Others
(Taiyo Oil, Teikoku Oil, and Others)
(425.5)
     Notes: *Includes former Mitsubishi Oil, Koa Oil, and Tohoku Oil
**Includes alliance for supplies in HyogoKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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As part of this consolidation, some refineries were shut down in an effort to improve margins.  Since
1998 approximately 283 kb/d of CDU capacity has been closed and there has been an additional 160
kb/d reduction in nameplate capacity.  It should be noted, however, that some of the reported closures
were simply mothballing of individual units and/or a reduction in crude runs.  In spite of these
shutdowns, the industry still has excess refining capacity of at least 1,100 kb/d and a glut of service


















Capacity (Calendar Day) Demand (Excluding Naphtha and LPG)
Essentially, Japan’s refiners are engaging in a game of tit-for-tat, where refiners shut down some
capacity if others do the same.  They are hesitant to shut down on their own because others will simply
take the market share.  Most recently, Nippon Oil Corporation (NOC) has concluded an alliance with
Idemitsu which accompanies Idemitsu’s decision to discontinue operations at its Hyogo refinery, which
has a current capacity of 80 kb/d.  Beginning in April 2003, NOC will supply approximately 40 kb/d of
petroleum products to Idemitsu.  At the same time, NOC will reduce the capacity of its refineries by 10
kb/d.  Other examples of cooperative arrangements include Showa Shell’s integration of its Kawasaki
refinery (120 kb/d) operations with Toa Oil (60 kb/d).  The combined operation is now officially underKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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the management of Toa Oil and roughly 200 of Showa Shell’s staff were transferred to Toa, which
offers a lower benefits package.
While the situation appears to be bleak for Japan’s refiners, it must be remembered that it could be
worse—there are several characteristics of the Japanese market that give domestic refiners built-in
protection from outside competition.  First, like all domestic refiners, the freight differential between
crude and product imports provides some support.  On top of this, the fact that the country has
relatively small product receiving terminals, coupled with hefty storage requirements for product
importers acts as a major brake on competition.  Finally, Japanese refiners enjoy favorable tariffs,
particularly for fuel oil.  While the market is nominally deregulated and open, this gauntlet of obstacles
makes it difficult for competitors to penetrate that market.
A future development that is on the horizon, that could radically alter the industry, is the change in
product specifications.  For example, refiners have already adjusted to a 50 PPM sulfur standard for
diesel, but the next round of reductions, likely to be 10-15 PPM, will be much more difficult to satisfy.
Some closures are inevitable.  The timetable is uncertain, but given trends in the U.S. and Europe it is
likely that 10-15 PPM will come by 2007-08.  Zero PPM, which would cause even more closures,
could come by 2010-2012.  Some Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) officials see
stricter specifications as the only real way to rationalize the industry and have pushed for a more rapid
tightening of specifications.
Overseas Investment Strategy
The Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) was established by the government in 1967 to provide
funding and other assistance to Japanese oil companies in an effort to aid in the acquisition of foreign oil
assets, as well as to establish strategic stockpiles.  The results have been disappointing, as in excess of
US$40 billion (in 1995 prices) has been spent with very little to show for it.  A key problem is that
JNOC’s structure was seriously flawed from the start.  Firms that borrowed money for exploration
ventures did not have to repay the loans if they were not successful—as was often the case.  By
JNOC’s own admission, Japanese companies lag behind in exploration and production, where they
cannot compete effectively with foreign oil companies.  JNOC also focused on establishing new findsKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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rather than acquiring existing assets, which would have often proved much more cost effective.  On top
of this lackluster performance, Japan recently lost the Arabian Oil Company’s neutral zone concessions
in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
In this context, negotiations surrounding access to the Azadegan field in Iran have taken on increased
importance.  Several Japanese companies—including INPEX, JAPEX and JNOC under the METI—
delivered a master development plan on November 20, 2002.  The Japanese companies proposed that
Shell be included as a potential partner, and in return Shell has sold 20 percent of its share in a project
to redevelop two large oil fields (Soroush and Nowruz) to a consortium of the same Japanese
companies, led by JAPEX.  There are a number of sticking points in the contract negotiations, including
the terms of the buy back, rate of return, etc., and it is not clear that the deal will go through.
Given its poor track record, it is not surprising that the Japanese parliament approved legislation
dissolving JNOC.  It is scheduled to be completely dismantled by 2005.  At the same time, Japan is
continuing its drive to secure more equity oil outside of the Middle East, with METI playing a key role in
recent talks with Russian ministries and oil companies, including Yukos, about the possibility of Japan
taking part in the development of oil fields in eastern Siberia.  Many of the plans that have been floating
in recent years are economically dubious, but Japan’s interest in the region is keen, and it is seen as the
most promising was to reduce dependence on Middle East supplies.  In addition, China has launched
similar drives to develop eastern Siberia, which seems to have prompted Japan to take swifter action on
the issue.
The details of the JNOC dissolution are still in the works, but it is understood that the assets held by
INPEX (50% owned by JNOC), which produces over 100 kb/d—mostly in Indonesia, JODECO
(90% owned by JNOC), which produces about 200 kb/d in the UAE, and SODECO (50% owned by
JNOC), which has a stake in Russia’s Sakhalin I, that is scheduled to come on stream in 2005 with a
peak production of approximately 250 kb/d, will be merged into an internationally competitive flagship
company.  This company will eventually be privatized, but safeguards will be put in place to ensure that
it is not taken over by an international oil company.  JNOC affiliate JAPEX is to be listed separately byKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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the end of this year.  Most of JNOC’s other assets would be disposed of over time, except for some of
the more valuable assets which may be taken over by the merged flagship company.
In 2003-04 the Japanese government plans to set up a new agency to continue JNOC’s role in
financing exploration.  This agency will also take over the management of Japan’s strategic oil stocks.
South Korea
While it is still growing robustly, South Korea’s economy and energy consumption are showing signs of
maturation.  South Korea’s economy bore the full brunt of the 1998 economic crisis, but then bounced
back rather quickly.  Growth in oil consumption has been slower to recover, however, dropping off
from the 1985-1995 period when overall demand grew by an average of 14 percent annually.
Key Indicators for South Korea's Petroleum Sector, 1995-2002
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
Oil Consumption (kb/d) 1,976 2,113 2,222 1,976 2,106 2,162 2,164 2,221
Annual Growth Rate 8.8% 6.9% 5.2% -11.1% 6.6% 2.6% 0.1% 2.6%
Refining Thruput (kb/d) 1,729 1,970 2,389 2,263 2,391 2,439 2,356 2,148
Crude Oil Imports (kb/d) 1,712 1,978 2,393 2,244 2,395 2,449 2,354 2,158
Product Imports (kb/d) 544 564 403 484 504 560 561 625
-LPG 146 151 157 135 158 153 132 153
-Naphtha 177 193 103 288 277 305 328 341
-Gasoline 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 13
-Kero/Jet 64 88 53 17 18 23 15 20
-Diesel 88 51 9 6 6 8 18 35
-Fuel Oil 68 80 72 35 44 69 61 63
Product Exports (kb/d) 347 438 611 827 816 838 808 658
-LPG 8 10 13 29 37 22 13 8
-Naphtha 59 88 101 123 127 133 140 124
-Gasoline 1 7 27 42 31 41 44 44
-Kero/Jet 46 62 65 126 135 158 158 142
-Diesel 116 153 250 296 242 265 248 215
-Fuel Oil 110 114 138 209 226 198 184 93
Notes: *Preliminary
Table 5
Important Facts and Issues
The past decade has been a period of deregulation and adjustment for South Korea’s downstream oil
industry.  Although official deregulation did not begin until 1996, deregulation plans have been
contemplated since the late 1980s.  The goal of the deregulation process was to eventually fully openKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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the market, but it was agreed among both government and industry that steps should be taken to ensure
that the Korean refiners were internationally competitive before abandoning controls.  Beginning in
1991, product prices were adjusted to ensure high profitability so the nation’s refiners could invest in
refinery expansions.  In 1996 formal price controls were abandoned and replaced with competitive
Singapore pricing, plus freight costs, plus a hefty “Korea factor” that was applied to ex-refinery prices.
The “Korea factor” was added to allow the refiners to continue to accumulate sufficient capital to make
major investments.  Over this period, as directed, the Korean refiners launched a massive capacity
expansion which serves as a barrier to potential entrants into the domestic refining business.  The
country now boasts two of the world’s largest refineries.
On January 1, 1997 prices were fully deregulated, but to everyone’s surprise they did not change.  It is
speculated that the Korean refiners had market sharing agreements and arranged to act as if price
controls were still in effect.  Since 1999 new entry and imports have been allowed in the downstream oil
sector.  A few independent retailers have entered and are putting some pressure on prices, but it is
unlikely that anyone will want to enter the market to build new refineries due to the current capacity


























 The overcapacity in the domestic market has resulted in the Korean refiners flooding the international
product market, in large part because they are supported by relatively high margins in the domestic
market.  It should be noted that the refiners that match their output most closely to relatively high priced
domestic demand are the best performers in the market (e.g., LG-Caltex).  At the same time, as long as
their exports do not incur losses, Korean refiners will run at very high utilization rates, as has often been
the case in the past.  More recently, depressed margins in the international market—which were in part
attributable to Korean refiners’ high utilization rates coupled with the entry of independent importers into
the market, leading to increased exports—resulted in a reduction of utilization factors to around 80-85
percent.
The deregulation process was designed so that the entrenched players, namely SK (formerly known as
Yukong), LG-Caltex (formerly Honam Oil), S-Oil (formerly Ssangyong), Hyundai (formerly Kukdong
Oil) and Hanwha (formerly Kyung-In Energy) retained their domination of the market.  In 1999
Hanwha was acquired by Hyundai under pressure from the government, as the former faced mounting
debt problems after the economic crisis.  Hanwha’s retail stations were absorbed into Hyundai and itsKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
 
46
successful IPP business was sold, but the refineries are run under two separate entities, namely Hyundai
and Inchon refineries.  After price deregulation in 1997 the market shares for each of these companies
remained more or less the same, with SK, LG-Caltex, and S-Oil retaining their market shares and
position as the top three refiners.  The exception was the changing market shares of Hyundai and
Hanwha, but this was a result of their merger, not any radical shift in the market.
Among other developments, it should be noted that 50 percent of Hyundai Oil’s equity was purchased
by Abu Dhabi’s IPIC (International Petroleum Investment Company), a joint venture between ADNOC
and the Abu Dhabi Investment Fund.  The $500 million purchase price gave IPIC 50 percent equity, 4
out of 7 directors, and effectively, control of the company.  The merits of IPIC’s investment appear to
be limited, as Hyundai and Inchon (as well as other refiners) face major financial losses.  Added to the
burden are major fines from the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) resulting from a complaint by the
Ministry of Defense alleging a bidding cartel among the refiners.  IPIC has responded by removing the
management of Hyundai Oil and allowing Inchon to fall into bankruptcy.
With the exception of S-Oil, all of the players are involved in product exchange agreements, which are
applied to all products with the exception of LPG.  There are two major product pipelines connecting
Ulsan (where most of the refineries are located) to Seoul.  One belongs to SK and LG-Caltex and the
other belongs to S-Oil.  Hyundai has a third, smaller pipeline.  The governing body in using these
pipelines is based on “equity shares” that are based on the volume that each company has transported.
These companies include all refineries, two airlines (Korean Air and Asiana), and the Korean National
Oil Company (KNOC).  It should be mentioned that the domestic oil companies are under no
obligation to cater to any particular area.
As for the retail sector, there were approximately 6,000 retail stations prior to the 1997 deregulation.
This number has grown to approximately 10,600 retail stations, around 15 percent of which are owned
or leased by the refiners.  The majority of the private owners are affiliated with the oil companies.
Although they are not obligated to stay with one refiner, they are usually loyal due to long-term
relationships.  The opening of the market has led to the rise of independent retailers that get their supply
mainly from imports.  As recently as 2000 their market share was insignificant, but they have nowKey Players in the Asia-Pacific Oil Market
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secured a little under 10 percent market share, prompting a challenge to the entrenched players.  The
key independents include Samyeon, Tiger Oil, PetroKorea, EG, and Lidcoff.  Samyeon is the largest
importer, followed by Tiger Oil and the other three which are all about the same size.  Tiger Oil is the
only independent with branded service stations.   It is unlikely that the independents will continue to
expand at such a rapid clip as securing retail sites is getting more difficult and expensive.  Moreover,
importers are required to acquire storage facilities for up to 60 days supply, which will limit future
expansions.
Currently, Korea’s petroleum product prices are among the most expensive in Asia, especially for
gasoline.  This is the result of hefty taxation, which is intended to discourage the consumption of certain
petroleum products.  For example, at one time, the retail price of gasoline was almost three times higher
than that of gasoil.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s taxes on LPG were insignificant, which served to
encourage its use as an alternative to the more heavily taxed kerosene.  Current import tariffs are 5
percent for crude oil and 7 percent for products, which provides a small level of protection for domestic
refiners.  In the face of low profitability, the industry has requested that the tariff on products be
increased to 12 percent.  It remains to be seen whether the new administration will support this change.
Overseas Investment Strategy
On the upstream side of the oil industry there is less action on the regulatory front, but the state-owned
Korea National Oil Company (KNOC) continues to push forward in pursuing equity stakes in
exploration and production, as well as fulfilling its duties in coordinating stockpiling.  The South Korean
government has charged KNOC with the goal of providing 10 percent of South Korea’s oil, or about
270 kb/d, by 2010.
Currently KNOC is a shareholder in production in fields in Yemen (Marib—24.5%), Argentina
(Palmarlargo—14%), Peru (Eight—40%), and the U.K. (Captain—15%).  It has also been involved in
the development of oil fields in Venezuela, Libya and Vietnam.  In addition to the countries listed above,
KNOC has been involved in exploration in a number of countries, including Angola, Algeria, Indonesia,




Because they dominate the Asia-Pacific oil market, the Key Players are indicative of important trends in
the region as a whole.  In general, upstream oil production is projected to remain flat over the coming
decades at the same time that oil consumption continues to rise at a rapid clip, albeit less rapidly than it
did from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s.  The net result will be a dramatic increase in imports,
especially from the Middle East.  The Key Players are wary of this trend and several have sought to
establish relationships with suppliers outside the Middle East, e.g., Russia, in an effort to ensure security
of supply.  In terms of overall demand, the impact of such move will be limited and it appears inevitable
that the Key Players and the Middle East will become increasingly intertwined in the future.
Due to a combination of rampant capacity additions and relatively stagnant demand, Asia-Pacific
refining margins have been in the doldrums in recent years.  The situation varies somewhat among the
Key Players, depending on the status of the domestic market, but in general the moves toward
deregulation and open markets have left them exposed to lower margins.  In the long-run the move
toward deregulation and increased transparency will help to establish the correct incentives for adding
capacity, but in the near term margins will remain low until the East of Suez refining capacity overhang
disappears.  We feel that 2002 was the low point and margins will begin to recover slowly in coming
years.
A final important trend that has emerged over the past several years is the increasingly aggressive pursuit
of overseas assets.  China and India have been especially assertive, sometimes moving into areas where
others are hesitant to tread for either political or public relations reasons, e.g., Iran and Sudan. This
trend will most likely continue as the concern over increasing import dependence grows in these
countries.